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Abstract
The global proliferation of cloud computing, smart homes, the internet of things and machine learning requires a novel 
view on the flow of confidential information and its classification. The security of an organisation is affected by the privacy 
enjoyed by its members. Sufficient data on those members can be leveraged in a so-called abduction attack aiming to extract 
confidential information from the organisation. To illustrate it we develop a model of actors and data flows and discuss three 
scenarios in which the confidentiality achievable by an organisation is limited by the privacy of its members. We support 
the model and the attack scenarios by reviews of the most prolific sources of personal data, its handling and its perceived 
value to the individuals it pertains to.
Introduction
The last decades have seen the proliferation of ubiquitous 
information services provided to the general public without 
direct financial cost to the individual user. The operators 
of these services routinely collect data about their users, 
with the intent to generate revenue, e.g. by serving targeted 
advertisements. The landscape of IT services is growing and 
includes services increasingly critical to the general public. 
This development has been accompanied by diverse mali-
cious activities, including bulk unsolicited email (spam), 
theft of information, theft of identity, denial of service, 
defacing of web property and fraud. Such incursions are 
met with stepped-up security devices and policies.
Such instances of the innovation–exploitation–reaction 
process show that, as an information society, we are still in 
an exploratory “shake-down” phase, despite what the dis-
ruptive effect of the intensive introduction of information 
processing and digital communication on public and private 
life might suggest. In many countries, the reactions have 
been underpinned by laws, in an attempt to suppress attacks 
or privacy breaches originating in their legal domain. They 
include the prohibition to tamper, remotely, with others’ IT 
infrastructure as well as rules and obligations with respect to 
the handling of personal data. However, there are also indi-
cations [26] for privacy regulations remaining unenforced 
for the benefit of data analysis revenue.
The meaning of the terms “security” and “privacy” have 
been consolidated during this period, driven by events as 
those described.
Information security concerns itself with the protection of 
stored data and communication processes. Its scope is the 
“preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of information”[4],1 as well as authenticity, accountability, 
non-repudiation and reliability.
Privacy is a multi-faceted term (cf. e.g. [22]). It has been dis-
cussed long before the advent of computers in law research 
[27] as the rights of a person with respect to normally con-
fidential information obtained without the person’s consent. 
Modern interpretations of the term include rights even after 
consent has been given, in the sense of data protection, 
concerning itself also with the collection, processing and 
exchange of data pertaining to a (natural) person. In pub-
lic discourse, the terms “security” and “privacy” are often 
found as contrary weights of the balance between the secu-
rity of a country (claimed to require information about its 
citizens) and the privacy of the individual. Such arguments 
typically discuss the amount of privacy that is sacrificed 
with the aim of improving security.
This article is part of the topical collection “Future Data and 
Security Engineering 2019” guest edited by Tran Khanh Dang.
 * Vitalian Danciu 
 danciu@nm.ifi.lmu.de
 http://www.mnm-team.org/~danciu
1 Institut für Informatik, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität 
München, Oettingenstraße 67, 80538 Munich, Germany
1 Numeric references to sections of the original text removed from 
quotation.
 SN Computer Science (2020) 1:205205 Page 2 of 10
SN Computer Science
Privacy has been argued to be important to society for 
reasons of the self-development of its individual members 
[9]. This reason is valid in the context of the formulation of 
law and the shepherding of culture. It does not seem compel-
ling in a setting where benefit is a function of revenue or of 
services consumed. Therefore, in this paper, we explore a 
reason that might have more appeal in that setting, by illus-
trating how organisational security can be undermined by 
the choice to waive privacy.
Hypothesis
To control access to undisclosed, i.e. private information, 
information security techniques (specifically cryptography) 
are commonly used to protect data locally or during trans-
mission. Therefore, privacy is often perceived by computer 
scientists as an application of information security to the 
personal sphere.
In this paper, which extends my work in [11], I argue that 
the reverse holds true also: that privacy of personal data is a 
prerequisite of effective information security. Figure 1 offers 
an illustration of these two views.
In particular, we explore how the security of an organi-
sation is limited by the privacy of its members, hence: the 
security of the organisation as an application of the privacy 
of the individual.
Synopsis
The intention of this paper is to raise awareness for attacks 
on the confidentiality of the information held by an organi-
sation by means of indirectly observing the behaviour of its 
members.
The background of the hypothesis, that security is contin-
gent on privacy, is the plethora of personal data being col-
lected and traded. We examine the reasons for data collection 
in Section “Background: A Situation Analysis” and estab-
lish that detailed data on the individuals and their behaviour 
is available. To lead up to examples on how an organisa-
tion’s confidentiality can be compromised, we formulate a 
model in Section “Model”. The model reduces real-world 
complexity to a small set of actors, their inter-relationships 
and the constraints under which they act. We introduce in 
Section “Abductive Attack Outline” three simple scenarios 
in which an organisation wishes to retain secrecy of some 
internal information while an adversary would try to acquire 
this information. For each, we outline how the desired infor-
mation can be inferred from legally available data. We dis-
cuss the implication of this ability and a selection of coun-
termeasures in Section “Discussion” before summarising our 
observations in Section “Conclusion”.
Background: A Situation Analysis
The abduction attack described in this paper is contingent 
on the availability of personal data pertaining to members of 
the organisation targeted by the attack. Thus, in this section 
we establish this availability by examining the data available 
for collection and the limitations imposed on the collection.
Data Proliferation
Despite the public outrage following some of the leaks of 
personal data in the last years, the privacy policies of many 
corporations offering “free” services assert that collected 
data may be passed on to third parties. Thus, the public out-
cries appear to be more motivated by the use that data have 
been put to, such as in the Cambridge Analytica affair [8], 
than the fact that it has been processed by third parties.
Our interaction with services, appliances and with each 
other in the course of everyday life is subject to recording 
by the providers of services, the producers and maintainers 
of appliances and the communications systems and services 
we employ.
Data sources 
Proliferation of data sources in the personal and utility 
domains of a person is ubiquitous, due to the pervasive use 
of personal network devices (phones, tablets, wearables, 
etc.) and the proliferation of “smart” appliances connected 
by the Internet of Things. The privacy implications of this 
emerging network have been discussed [1–3, 7] but mostly in 
the sense of requiring consent from the users whose privacy 
may be implicated by the dissemination of the data.
The data potentially collectable by different devices 
that we use in daily life either in the personal or the utility 
domain. The data collection within the private domain is 
triggered explicitly, and the user has some control over it. 
Table 1 describes exemplary data sources from this domain.
A device in the utility domain is under the control of a 
provider (e.g. the electricity grid operator): data collection 
may trigger implicitly, without the user interacting directly 
with the device. Examples for such devices are given in 
Table 2. The tables list examples of a device class, the kinds 
of data collectable by an operator/maintainer of the device 








Fig. 1  Inter-reliant disciplines
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A comprehensive collection of data sources would nec-
essarily include as a focus common information services. 
Communication services (email, voice/video call, chat) and 
social network services are well known to handle and col-
lect data about their users. Indirect exposure is inherent to 
many services. Person A posting a photo of Person B on 
social media, or sending Person B an email from a “free” 
mail service divulges to those service providers information 
about Person B without his knowledge or consent.
Economy of Indirect Exchange
The collection of personal data requires in many legisla-
tions the consent of the person it belongs to. We will review 
how consent is obtained from a perspective of economic 
exchange.
Figure 2 shows three different exchange scenarios. The 
traditional exchange is that a person will pay for both ser-
vices used and goods purchased, as shown in the uppermost 
part of the diagram.
Since many years now, information services are being 
provided to users without direct financial compensation. It 
is also common that the provider requires consent for the use 
of data in exchange for the use of the services, including the 
data processed by the service (e.g. messages) and the meta-
data (addresses, interactions with the user interface). Service 
providers generate revenue by “harvesting” attention (for 
advertising to the general public) and data (for sale or for 
advertising to a specific group or to the individual). Vendors 
leverage this attention to place advertisements targeted by 
(profile) data about the user.
The connection between service use and indirect payment 
is dissolved when it becomes unimportant if a certain user 
Table 1  Exemplary data sources within the personal domain of an individual
Class Example Data kind Inferable information
Portable Smartphone, Smart watch, GPS naviga-
tion
Contacts, location, speed, information 
access, communication events, com-
munication content, time of events
Home, work and other frequented 
addresses, daily schedule, entertain-
ment preferences, travel, social circle, 
health concerns
Appliance TV, dishwasher, washing machine, air 
conditioner, vacuum robot
Usage, program Current occupation/activity, habits, 
entertainment interest, home layout
Voice activation Echo and similar, toy/baby-phone Ambient audio, speech recognition 
result
Environment audio, voice print, number 
of persons present, daily schedule, 
queries
Table 2  Exemplary data sources within the utility domain of an individual
Class Example Data kind Inferable information
Smart home Lights, blinds, temperature, locks Presence, environment configuration Current occupation/action, daily 
schedule
Smart grid Electricity, gas, water Usage events, usage volume, concur-
rent usage
Operated device, persons in household, 
daily schedule, current occupation/
action
Payment Credit card, online payment, phone 
payment
Time, volume, recipient, credit Economic status, shopping habit, gen-
der, age, location/travel
Private transport Emergency locator, diagnostics Location, usage Itinerary, occupation, travel habits
Public transport Personal ticket, face recognition Journey events Itinerary, home and work area





































Fig. 2  Exchange of services and compensation
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will spend his money on the advertised goods, as long as a 
sufficient number of users from the targeted demographic do, 
as suggested in the lower part of Fig. 2. The strong growth of 
the “Internet companies” suggests that the combined worth 
of attention and personal data is much higher than the cost 
to provide and deliver the services.
Besides targeted advertising, the personal data can be lev-
eraged to infer financial, risk, health and other information 
about a person. Such information can be employed outside 
the information services. Despite these issues, customers 
continue to agree to the exchange because (a) the cost to 
them is hidden (“just ads”), (b) they perceive that the cost 
is to a group and not personal c) the services have become a 
necessity and (d) they are uneducated with respect to alterna-
tive, less invasive services. In the case of devices, the use of 
the device may necessitate consent to the collection of data 
by an associated online service. We review in the following 
the issues of consent (Section “Consent”) and the valuation 
of personal data by the owner himself (Section “Valuation 
of Personal Data”).
Consent
Solove [23] discusses the reasons for why consent is cur-
rently ineffective as an instrument for privacy. He identi-
fies the conceptual and structural issues illustrated in Fig. 3, 
which appear consistent with the results of surveys on pri-
vacy administered to members of the general public.
The cognitive issues reflect the difficulty to read and 
understand (“comprehension”) a frequently large (“size/
required effort”) body of text. This text may be written in 
the style of a legal text and be intended to cover a multitude 
of cases for present and future data use, resulting in vague 
and general statements about what data may be collected 
and how it might be treated subsequently (“precision of 
language”).
The structural issues include the difficulty for the indi-
vidual to manage the agreements with a large number of data 
collectors, which exacerbates the effort required to manage 
consent (grant, withhold or withdraw) based on informed 
decisions.
The remaining two structural issues reflect the lack of 
insight on the part of the data owners with respect to the 
aggregation of multiple data sets on one hand and regard-
ing the risk to them if isolated or aggregated items of per-
sonal data are collected and disseminated. The former would 
require knowledge about data analysis techniques that allow 
the extraction of information beyond the literal data about a 
person. The latter would require knowledge about the lever-
age afforded to entities acquiring such data with respect to 
the data owner. Hence, in both cases the decision on consent 
would need to be informed on the basis of specific technical 
knowledge that is not available to the average data owner. It 
seems probable that these issues in particular lead to a low 
valuation of personal data.
Valuation of Personal Data
Figure 4 shows the approximate range of bids accepted by 
survey participants for different kinds of personal data: The 
studies show disclosure of location information for around 
10 GBP [12], disclosure of location information (1 month) 
for 1–150 EUR, with 10% of the bids below 1 EUR [10], 
and willingness to have their quiz results and body weight 
disclosed for a benefit of 0.25 USD [17], disclosure of date-
of-birth and income for a benefit of 1 EUR [6], disclosure 
of shopping choices for 2 USD [5], disclosure of the date-
of-birth and body weight for bids of USD 6–12 [18], sale of 
private data attributes for bids around 10 USD [25].
It is fair to note that, the studies that produced the data all 
had different methods and sample sizes, they were conducted 
in different countries and in different peer groups. While the 
comparison of numerical results is awkward, their collec-
tion does allow a tentative quantification for the monetary 
privacy valuation of individuals. These numbers suggest a 
rather high willingness to exchange personal data for some 
benefit, while the price/benefit extracted by the (former) 
owner of the personal data remains rather low. Despite pri-








































































Fig. 4  Value of privacy
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We can conclude that, as a rule, consent to use and 
disseminate private data is given due to its low valuation 
compared to the high cost of refusing the use of common 
services.
De‑anonymisation
Collectors and brokers of data may be required to anonymise 
the data they collect, thus disconnecting it from the known 
identity of the user. However, de-anonymisation has been 
shown to be effective with only few data points, e.g. for 
credit card data [13], for web browsing data [24], and 
for video-on-demand ratings [21]. In all these cases, de-
anonymisation was performed by using multiple data sets 
with an overlap of attributes and reasoning over the cases 
where the overlapping attributes matched. Zhou et al con-
clude [28] that anonymisation techniques for social network 
data should be developed reactively to be effective. Such 
findings suggest that mandatory anonymisation may increase 
the effort of the adversary but not obviate the achievement 
of his goal.
Behaviour interpretation
The behaviour of people can be observed indirectly by evalu-
ating effects in their environment. Data from utility sensors 
as well as communication meta-data represent such effects. 
It can be procured passively, by trading for data already in 
the market or actively, by stimulation. Active acquisition 
entails pro-active requests for consent to a candidate group 
of individuals, observation of the reaction of users to time- 
or place-constrained prompts/offers, etc.
Summary
The findings from this section can be summarised as follows:
• There is a huge and growing number of data sources.
• Individuals perceive the value of their personal data as 
low, compared to the services they take.
• Individuals are under pressure to use IT services (peer 
pressure, perceived lack of alternatives).
• Individuals default to granting consent.
• Data collector and service provider roles (often the same 
entity) profit from this situation, which motivates them 
to maintain it.
• Re-identifying single persons from anonymised data sets 
is possible if the data sets are combined.
From this description of the environment, it is possible to 
create a model centred on the data owner.
Model
We develop a model consisting of definitions of roles, their 
relationships, as well as the domains of data relevant to indi-
viduals. Within the model, we formulate a number of plau-
sible assumptions as to the behaviour of the different roles. 
The purpose of the model is on the one hand to constrain the 
complexity of the real world to a manageable level (while 
retaining plausibility) and on the other hand to establish a 
terminology for use in the remainder of the paper.
Actors
We identify the following six roles, sketched in Fig. 5 as 
relevant to our analysis.
The Organisation is a company or other organisation that 
wishes to keep its internal information a secret.
The Adversary wishes to acquire some secret information of 
the organisation. The adversary cannot be a member of the 
organisation, nor the organisation itself. The adversary may 
be an organisation in the general sense, a group of people or 
a single individual.
A Person is a member of the organisation (e.g. an employee 
of a company) that works on site but does not reside on site 
.The person uses common information services to reduce 
chores, make payments, participate in social life, for enter-
tainment and so on. Persons are the sources of personal data.
A Collector directly collects data from persons. Collec-
tors include providers of pure information services (elec-





















Fig. 5  Actors, domains and data flow
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applications), network service providers, utility providers 
(electricity, heating, gas), vendors of IoT-based devices but 
also vendors of enhanced traditional products (cars, domes-
tic appliances) and financial companies.
A Processor processes data for further use. Processing 
includes aggregation, profiling, indexing, tracking of use 
and analysis for a specific purpose (e.g. the assessment of 
usage of a service over time).
A Broker or Trader facilitates the exchange of data sets and 
the sale of data sets for profit.
Domains
We differentiate between three disjunct domains, which 
denote authority over their own set of functions and the data 
they process: the professional, personal and utility domain. 
The domains structure the devices employed by persons, 
allowing them to generate data within the professional and 
personal domains and to trigger data generation within the 
utility domain.
The professional domain is that in which the person acts on 
behalf of the organisation. It encompasses a person’s interac-
tion with communication and information systems provided 
by the organisation and using utilities at the organisation’s 
site (e.g. network connectivity).
The personal domain encompasses the functions that pertain 
to the private sphere of the person. That includes private 
communication, entertainment, private transport, home 
automation.
The utility domain encompasses the person’s use of devices 
whose function requires information services outside the 
personal domain and utility services (network connectiv-
ity, electricity, gas, public transportation, home delivery 
services, etc.), which may generate data collectable by the 
respective utility provider.
Abductive attack outline
Data collected from members of the organisation may be 
employed by the adversary to discover information confiden-
tial to the organisation. The adversary uses the data available 
to infer the confidential information of the organisation. We 
call this an abductive attack, since the adversary’s result is 
acquired by the abductive inference and constitutes a best 
interpretation that cannot be verified without knowledge of 
ground truth. In this section, we examine a number of such 
scenarios as thought experiments.
For a successful abduction attack, the following are 
necessary: 
1. A goal a specification for the information that is nor-
mally confidential to the victim and that the adversary 
attempts to acquire
2. A correlation model the information may be inferred 
from data not directly related to it. The model speci-
fies the relationships between different data, that allow 
to infer intermediary information leading to the goal, 
or that allow to derive the goal itself. For example, the 
model may be chosen as a Bayes Network, i.e. a directed 
acyclic graph with nodes representing the incidence of 
different kinds of data and links denoting their relation-
ship.
3. Observation data satisfying all the kinds of data required 
by the model.
4. An inference procedure that operates on the model.
Assumptions
Given the model described in the previous section we 
make the following assumptions about the behaviour of 
the model roles and their environment.
Times and places We assume that the organisation operates 
a single site and a single network. Constraining the model 
simplifies the demonstration of the analysis without invali-
dating its approach in principle. At any given point in time, 
a person is located:
• at work, at the organisation site
• at their home
• en-route
• at a third location from a (small) set (e.g. store, gym, 
restaurant) that are visited regularly.
We differentiate between working hours, spent at the 
organisation’s site and leisure time, spent at home or at a 
third location.
Fair play We assume that, laws and policies are respected 
by all roles. While this may not always be the case in reality, 
the purpose of our analysis is to show how confidentiality 
may be broken without resorting to illegal means. Thus, we 
assume the following:
• Data are being collected, processed and traded with 
consent.
• Collectors perform (pseudo-)anonymisation if required 
by law.
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• Organisation policy prohibits their members to dissemi-
nate information pertaining directly to the organisation’s 
concerns.
• The adversary refrains from any direct attack on the 
organisation, including direct social engineering target-
ing single persons.
Data availability We have established in Section Data Prolif-
eration the existence of a rich, growing and free data market. 
Hence, we assume that exchange of data and remuneration 
is not technically limited, i.e. if a data point is collectable, 
then it is available for analysis.
Example scenarios
Consider the following three scenarios in which the adver-
sary attempts to acquire knowledge about undisclosed, inter-
nal aspects of an organisation. For each scenario we develop 
a procedure usable by the adversary to acquire the desired 
information starting only with the information presented in 
the respective scenario in addition organisation’s physical 
location and its network address range. All scenarios are 
framed within the bounds of the model and constitute cases 
in which the adversary is apt to break the confidentiality of 
the organisation.
Current production load. A production site, a factory, wants 
to keep confidential the production load from their (over-
seas) customers. During times of high production load, the 
factory employs additional workers in order to fill three 
shifts. Disclosure of the production load may have influence 
on the company’s stock value or lead to the loss of poten-
tial contracts, should the apparent situation contradicts the 
available capacity advertised to customers.
Persons who travel to the organisation’s site and arrive 
there within a time interval, then leave the organisation’s 
site approximately eight hours later, may be workers. The 
number of time intervals for arrival should indicate to the 
adversary the number of shifts currently employed by the 
organisation.
Data items, that can indicate arrivals, include
• Location data from phones in proximity of the site
• The amount of traffic issued from the organisation’s net-
work to sign-in services
• The number of passengers on collective transport, which 
serves a station near the site
• The number of vehicles in the site’s parking
• The number of transactions at nearby shops, which may 
be visited by employees before or after work
• The number of transactions at vending machines at the 
site
We note that the extraction of single identities is not strictly 
necessary for the task. The adversary may conclude the 
desired information by studying the variance of one of the 
data items and increase the certainty of the result by study-
ing two or more.
It is also important to note that, in this special case, the 
adversary can attain his goal without resorting to the use 
of personal data. This suggests that the privacy of utilities 
and devices may be of importance to security considerations 
even when a direct connection to single persons’ behaviour 
can be excluded.
Time of deployment. A military unit in peacetime wants to 
keep confidential their schedule of deployment to manoeu-
vres or exercises. Between exercises, personnel are author-
ised to leave the unit’s site during leisure and during the 
night. The impact on the organisation, if the schedule is 
disclosed, includes a bad performance in the exercise or 
disturbance by observers from the general public.
The adversary can predict deployments in the short term 
by inferring them from a change in the behaviour of the 
members of the unit. For example, an exercise starting in the 
early morning would prompt members of the unit to either 
stay on site over the night or to rise extra early. Both behav-
iour patterns are indirectly observable but require the crea-
tion of unique identities of the organisation’s members in 
order to distinguish instances of one pattern from the other. 
For each digital identity the adversary determines the fol-
lowing data items:
• home location, which can be acquired from location data 
or address data or utility providers
• duration of the person’s time en-route between home and 
the organisation’s site, which can be approximated by 
plotting the route between the two locations
• regular home departure time, i.e. the regular time of the 
day when the person prepares to travel from home, that 
may be mapped by an interval of activity followed by the 
cessation of events at the home location by observing 
utility use, network traffic. It can be determined more 
directly, from sensor data (e.g. increased use of appli-
ances) or, if available, from location updates.
• home arrival time, i.e. the point in time when a person 
arrives at the home location. That point in time can be 
determined by the same means as the home departure 
time.
In an instance where the regular time for travel changes for 
one person, we can infer that, the person is due to arrive 
at the organisation’s site after the person’s typical en-route 
time. An accumulation of instances of this kind would pre-
dict an imminent deployment to the adversary. This pat-
tern may be preceded by the observation that some of the 
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organisation’s members failed to arrive at home the day 
before, in contrast to their regular behaviour. If timely pre-
diction is important to the adversary, these latter instances 
may be exploited as first signs of an imminent event. Predic-
tion accuracy might be improved by accounting for regular 
visits to away locations, regular variations in the persons’ 
respective schedules
We note that in isolation, the data items correlated by 
the adversary are innocuous but become instrumental when 
combined with a correct assumption about a mechanism (in 
this case: commuting between home and the organisation’s 
site).
Identities of research personnel.
A research company wishes to keep confidential the exact 
identity of its research employees, in order to avoid their 
recruiting by competitors. The company files applications 
for public research grants when offers of grants are pub-
lished. Before application deadlines, research person-
nel works longer hours in order to complete the proposal 
documents.
The adversary formulates the conjecture that those per-
sons whose working hours change in proximity of a deadline 
are the targets of recruiting by competitors. Their identi-
fication makes use of data items and correlations already 
described in the previous two scenario examples. The differ-
ence in this scenario is the need for the extraction of actual 
identities.
Using the publicly available time-frames of grant applica-
tions, the adversary can select a set of candidates, as in the 
“Time of deployment” scenario, e.g. by observing commute 
times. The adversary needs to attempt to de-anonymise each 
of the persons in the candidate set.
Discussion
The scenarios described in the previous section  have 
sketched the use of seemingly harmless personal and non-
personal data produced by persons within the organisation 
to deduct confidential information items of the organisation.
Properties
The abductive attack has a number of interesting proper-
ties. It is 
1. performed within the boundaries of the law. The data 
exchange and processing employed are legal, and the 
methods for inferring the desired information points are 
similar or identical to those used in academic research, 
or in the prosaic activity of a private detective.
2. indirect, as the organisation itself is never targeted 
directly.
3. undetectable during initiation and execution and virtu-
ally untraceable post mortem. Even knowledge of the 
adversary’s actions does not immediately enable the 
organisation to conclude that it is being targeted.
4. executable by the adversary remotely, from another legal 
domain, provided data trading and processing by third 
parties is legal and available at the adversary’s location.
5. executable without special authority or knowledge by 
using the broker and processor roles. The adversary 
needs neither authority for collecting data nor expertise 
in finding and correlating it.
Limitations
Not every kind of secret can be acquired by the means illus-
trated in the scenarios. To be effective, the approach must tie 
in to the behaviour of persons observable in their personal 
and utility domains.
The method relies on the correct formulation of a theory 
by the adversary, which allows interpretation of the avail-
able data by abduction. Even the theories in the examples in 
Section “Example scenarios”, simple and plausible as they 
seem, may not hold for every production site, military unit 
or research lab. Therefore, a targeted attack seems difficult 
to automate fully, as it requires the judgement of a human 
mind. It might be possible, however, to increase the level of 
automation by recording patterns of judgement.
Finally, the accuracy of the information gained cannot 
be ascertained without at least verifying several instances 
of the same case. Obviously, this property originates in the 
abductive nature of the process.
Countermeasures
The abductive attack seems impossible if the data produced 
by all persons associated with an organisation are insuffi-
cient to derive with any useful probability a given confi-
dential item of information that the organisation wishes to 
safeguard. Since an assurance of this state is implausible, the 
organisation and its members should aim to limit the data 
that is useful to the adversary.
Differential privacy
Similar problems have been studied in the context of sta-
tistical databases, to address combinations of queries that, 
while harmless alone, would allow the inference of privi-
leged information if their results were combined. Dwork 
introduces the concept of differential privacy to address this 
issue in [14, 16]. This line of study is valuable and is being 
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applied in privacy audit systems (e.g. [19]). The introduc-
tion of noise in the data has been shown [15] to suppress the 
exposure of private information.
The structural dissimilarity of databases with the global 
data market seems to obviate the introduction of such meas-
ures in the cases described in this paper. While privacy is 
being pursued by the operator of the database for the benefit 
of the persons registered therein, there is neither a single 
operator for the data market, nor is there an incentive for the 
operators that do exist, to act.
Policy
Suppressing abductive attacks by policy seems difficult: 
policy makers would have to differentiate between inference 
as used in any research and that performed with a mali-
cious intent. Scholars have proposed granting rights to the 
so-called ad hoc groups [20] that are assembled through 
analysis and classification of individuals’ behaviour. The 
members of an ad hoc group may correspond to the mem-
bers of an organisation.
Self-defense Organisations may wish to guard themselves 
against instances of abductive attacks that may constitute 
industrial espionage. However, interfering with the lives of 
their members beyond the professional domain of our model 
may prove difficult for all but very few organisations. Incen-
tives for the protection of personal data could be given by
• subsidising paid, anonymous services for the benefit of 
its members—to avoid them using the “free” ones,
• guiding in the choice of devices and services and
• raising awareness for the security risk to the organisation.
Conclusion
Analysis of personal data, like any conceptual tool, may 
be used for society’s benefit, for example in medical and 
pharmaceutical research or reputation systems. However, a 
rich data market paired with automated data analysis ren-
der possible the inference of confidential information of an 
organisation from the personal and utility data produced by 
its members.
Corporations, i.e. commercial organisations may wish 
to guard confidential information. Especially during strate-
gic restructuring (merger, acquisition) even small items of 
information being disclosed may have a large impact. The 
protections afforded individual persons by law do not extend 
to organisations. Hence, the victim organisations are third 
parties to an exchange between their members and the data 
industry.
It is important to note that today the process of acquisi-
tion of confidential data can be automated to a high degree 
thus lowering both the financial and the time cost for the 
procedure. If the reward for the adversary justifies the cost 
of obtaining and processing the necessary data, the subver-
sion of an organisation’s confidentiality becomes possible 
without substantial legal risk or risk of detection.
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